
Defense Department counted PLAN amphibious ships and, in the 2020 edition of its report on the Chinese military, decided the lack of a massive LST-construction program means Beijing isn’t serious about invading Taiwan. “Others would be held in reserve for crushing and decisive counterattacks.” “Some tanks would likely come into action as soon as the enemy began landing,” said Ian Easton, an analyst with the Project 2049 Institute in Virginia. Still, if the Chinese stick to the beaches, the Taiwanese probably can count on an armor advantage in the first few hours of fighting. And the PLA won’t be able to land 379 tanks of its own. The Chinese navy for its part surely will suffer heavy losses to Taiwanese mines, missiles and torpedoes while crossing the strait-and further losses while unloading troops on narrow beaches surrounded by cliffs and prepared fighting positions.Īll that is to say, the ROC army won’t be able to throw 1,200 tanks at the beachheads. Likewise, Chinese bombardment surely would knock out at least a few tanks. It’s safe to assume not all of Taiwan’s tanks would be fully crewed and up on maintenance on Z-Day. And that’s assuming the entire fleet mobilizes for an invasion and suffers zero losses while crossing the Taiwan Strait under fire.įriction is inevitable on both sides.

In any event, the Chinese navy can land a third as many tanks as the Taiwanese army possesses. The assault ships and landing docks embark air-cushion landing craft that themselves each can haul ashore one tank. The LSTs themselves carry tanks and directly land them on beaches via their bow ramps. After all, the PLAN’s entire amphibious force-three Type 075 assault ships, eight Type 071 landing docks and 64 Type 073 and Type 074 tank landing ships-together can haul just 379 tanks.
